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QuenchWorks

terralist

Image · Registry · standard · v0.11.0

A 1cosign signedSPDX SBOMSLSA provenanceamd64 · arm64Rebuilt 2026-10-11

Terralist, a private Terraform and OpenTofu registry for modules and providers (registry protocol, web UI, OAuth login, API keys). Built from source, UI included, with the vulnerable modules floated.

Current digest (deployed by the chart)

sha256:13242604e721b5bf41754e4234e37bc9df473a1d7293983f4e267d153cb76f7f

Signatures, the SBOM, and provenance all attach to this digest. Pin to it for reproducible, tamper-evident pulls.

Image
ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/terralist:0.11.0
Signed
cosign keyless
SBOM
SPDX, on digest
Provenance
SLSA build
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
Image size
48.6 MB

Published versions

1 tag

Each tag is a multi-arch index (amd64 + arm64) pinned by digest. Tagged by version, never :latest.

VersionSizePublishedDigest
0.11.0latest48.6 MB2026-10-11sha256:13242604e721…

Security report (Trivy)

A· 98/1001 open · no upstream fix yet

Vulnerability detail

terralist 0.11.0 · 1 CVE
CVESeverityPackageInstalledFixed inTitle
GO-2026-5932UNKNOWNgolang.org/x/cryptov0.57.0— not fixableThe golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues
0
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Unknown
fixable per nightly scan · peak 342 of 104 days with any · 2026-06-29 to 2026-10-11

Pull the image

Run it directly with Docker, Podman, or any Kubernetes workload. Nonroot, read-only root filesystem, built for amd64 and arm64.

Pull (tag)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/terralist:0.11.0

Pinned by digest (recommended)

docker pull ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/terralist@sha256:13242604e721b5bf41754e4234e37bc9df473a1d7293983f4e267d153cb76f7f

Tags

0.11.00.11.0-amd640.11.0-arm64

Images are tagged by app version (never :latest): a multi-arch index plus per-arch tags.

App version
0.11.0
Architectures
amd64, arm64
Runs as
nonroot (uid 1001)
Root filesystem
read-only
License
MPL-2.0

Verify the supply chain

This image is cosign-signed and carries an SPDX SBOM and a SLSA build-provenance attestation on the same digest. Check all three yourself:

# 1. signature — built and signed by QuenchWorks CI
cosign verify ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/terralist:0.11.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 2. SLSA build provenance — which workflow built it, from what
cosign verify-attestation --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/terralist:0.11.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

# 3. SPDX SBOM — the package inventory
cosign verify-attestation --type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 ghcr.io/quenchworks/images/terralist:0.11.0 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/quenchworks/.+' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

See the SBOM & provenance guide for reading the SBOM and using these checks in CI.

Transparency

Every image carries its SBOM and provenance as attestations on the same digest, publicly verifiable with the commands above (they check the package and the Sigstore transparency log, Rekor).

View the Helm chartView package

Upstream project: https://www.terralist.io